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Oil and Gas: Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co.: Lessor's
Distant Beacon of Hope - Will Oklahoma See It?
L Introduction
Take-or-pay gas contracts between natural gas producers and pipeline companies
are a dynamic issue in the field of oil and gas law. Such contracts sparked
exponential litigation between gas producers and pipeline companies when diminished
demand for gas deteriorated the market in the early 1980s.' Pipeline companies
could neither take nor pay for the gas for which they had bargained. Litigation on
the pipeline/producer contracts ignited further disputes between royalty owners and
their producers as the royalty owners sought their share of the revenues derived from
the leases, i.e., the take-or-pay proceeds or settlements!
In Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson,3 Oklahoma's first case addressing
the rights of the lessors to take-or-pay settlement proceeds, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court decided that lessors do not share in such payments.4 This decision deprived
Oklahoma land owners of hundreds of millions of dollars in royalties on income
derived from their land. The decision also yielded precedent which is confusing and
ill-prepared to address the rights of the relevant parties in the inevitable future
litigation.
This note compares the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Watts
v. Atlantic Richfield Co.s with the Oklahoma Supreme Court's reasoning in Roye. In
Watts, the Tenth Circuit decided an issue closely related to take-or-pay settlement
proceeds based on Oklahoma law. The Watts reasoning highlights the weaknesses
of Roye and demonstrates the need for Roye to be strictly limited to the facts of the
case. Royalty law that adequately protects the rights of all relevant parties to the oil
and gas lease must be established. In the interest of justice, the confusion of Roye
should quietly pass into history and an improved line of reasoning should be adopted.
Part II of this note reviews the relevant oil and gas industry background and the
countervailing lines of reasoning which jurisdictions have applied to take-or-pay
royalty disputes. Specifically, the "plain terms" reasoning applied in Roye will be
compared with the "cooperative venture" theory set forth by Professor Thomas
HarrellW While plain terms jurisdictions apply a four comers approach to royalty
1. See John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 227 (1996).
2. For an informative discussion of the "take-or-pay wars," see J. Michael Medina, A Report from
the Battle Zone: The Take Or Pay Wars, 58 OKLA. B.J. 2554 (1987), and J. Michael Medina, The Take-
Or-Pay Wars: A Further Status Report, 41 OK.A. L. REv. 381 (1988).
3. 949 P.2d 1208 (Okla. 1996). For an informative discussion of this decision, the surrounding
issues and a summary of other jurisdictions' handling of those issues, see James Muenker, Oil and Gas:
Roye Realty & Developing v. Watson - An Answer to the Take-or-Pay Royalty Issue in Oklahoma or
Simply More Confusion?, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 751 (1996).
4. See Roye, 949 P.2d at 1217.
5. 115 F.3d 785 (10th 1997).
6. See Thomas A. Harrell, Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil & Gas Law, 30 INST. ON OIL &
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clause analysis, tho:3e jurisdictions that use the cooperative venture theory take the
intent of the parties into consideration when analyzing lease agreements. The
narrowly divided Roye court denied Oklahoma lessors any share of take-or-pay
settlement proceeds based on a plain terms approach to contract interpretation.7 In
contrast, the cooperative venture theory holds that lessors and lessees enter into lease
agreements for the purpose of sharing jointly in all of the economic benefits derived
from the leased land.! The partners in the joint venture simply divide all revenues
arising from their joint operation in the proportion described in the royalty clause of
their lease
Part III explores the Watts decision. The Watts holding allows royalty owners the
opportunity to seek their due share of settlement proceeds received by their lessees
when those proceeds are derived from litigation of other than the take-or-pay variety.
Watts preserves the rights of Oklahoma lessors to many royalties, in contrast to Roye,
which apparently would have rendered lessors unable to claim royalty on much of
the revenues derived from their leases.
Though it may load to further litigation on the subject,"0 application of Watts
offers Oklahoma lessors hope that their contractual expectations will be satisfied. Part
IV of this note will analyze the application of Watts. The Watts holding, if adopted
in Oklahoma, will undoubtedly play a role in future related issues. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court will accept the reasoning of
the Tenth Circuit, which chose to distinguish Roye.
17. Background
A. Take-or-Pay History
From the late 1930s to the early 1980s, natural gas producers and pipeline
companies had incentive to enter into long-term, take-or-pay sales contracts." By
the mid-1980s, an excess supply of natural gas"2 left the pipeline companies locked
GAS L. & TAXN 311, 334 (1979).
7. See Roye, 949 P.2d at 1217.
8. See Harrell, supra note 6, at 334.
9. See id.
10. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
11. Under the terms of such contracts, pipeline companies are required to take either a specified
minimum amount of gas, or to pay for that amount if it is not taken. See 8 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 1099 (1996). This arrangement was mutually beneficial to both
the producer and the pipeline company. The contract gave the producer incentive to explore for and to
develop natural gas resernoirs, and it also guaranteed the pipeline companies the supply of gas needed
to service their customers
12. Prompted by the natural gas shortages of the 1970s, the federal government began to regulate
the gas market. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1994), spawned increased
exploration for natural ga- by establishing price ceilings for gas sales which essentially eliminated all
price competition. In order to meet anticipated long-term gas shortages, producers entered the long-term,
take-or-pay contracts. Pilline companies were similarly encouraged to enter such contracts as they
allowed the pipeline companies to minimize the risk of demand fluctuations. See Lowe, supra note 1,
at 225-28.
[Vol. 52:145
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss1/7
NOTES
into long-term, high-priced, take-or-pay contracts, the maintenance of which was not
economically feasible. 3 In turn, this market failure led to breach of the long-term,
take-or-pay contracts between producers and pipeline companies. The pipelines were
unable to take the gas or pay the massive fees which grew out of the long-term
agreements because their liability often surpassed their net worth.
Pipeline companies unsuccessfully asserted various legal defenses in their attempts
to avoid the massive contractual liability owed to their gas producers. 4 Rather than
force the pipeline companies into bankruptcy, the producers settled their claims for
a fraction of the amount owed 5 and negotiated new sales contracts with the
purchasers. Even so, the amount of the settlements totaled in the billions industry-
wide. Naturally, lessors sought their royalty share of those billions.
Disputes between producers and pipeline companies sparked a litigious chain
reaction which has not yet run its course. Initially, the producers sued their various
pipeline companies to recover damages for breach of their take-or-pay contracts.
Subsequently, the various lessors took action to recover their royalty share of the
proceeds from the agreements between the producers and the pipelines.
Similar litigation will inevitably follow. Currently, gas is priced and sold under a
variety of contracts that involve payments that, like take-or-pay payments, are not
direct payments for produced gas. A variety of marketing fees called "producer
demand charges"'7 are collected by lessees. These payments, however, often carry
a label other than "production." As a result, lessors may not receive royalties on
these revenues in jurisdictions which follow the four comers approach to contract
interpretation. Because "producer demand charges" were not explicitly mentioned in
the lease arrangements, a plain terms jurisdiction will not recognize such revenues
as royalty-producing. Given the monetary magnitude of these issues, debate is sure
to follow as lessors seek to share, through royalties, in the economic benefits derived
from their land. It remains to be seen whether lessors will be allowed to claim a
share of such proceeds in Oklahoma.
13. See Bruce M. Kramer, Liability to Royalty Owners for Proceeds From Take-or-Pay and
Settlement Payments, 15 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 14.01 (1994).
14. Estimates of the total of the actual liability incurred by pipeline companies are in the
neighborhood of $60 billion to $70 billion. See Lowe, supra note 1, at 227.
15. Estimates of the total pipeline settlement costs are in the neighborhood of $12 billion to $15
billion. See id.
16. The concurrence of settling the breached contracts (often for pennies on the dollar) and
renegotiating contracts at the same time offered producers, at the least, an opportunity to structure the
pair of dealings in a manner which favored themselves over the royalty owners; given the billions of
dollars in lost revenues from the settlements with the pipelines, producers certainly had the incentive to
favor themselves. Producers may have been encouraged to negotiate a low sale price for gas in the new
contracts in exchange for an increased settlement in the take-or-pay dispute, realizing that the settlement
proceeds may not be subject to royalties while the sale of the gas surely would be.
17. Demand charges, including take-or-pay payments, are payments made to producers for standing
ready to supply gas to sales customers. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL
OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 273 (9th ed. 1994).
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B. The Evolution of the Case Law
As lessors began to claim their shore of take-or-pay proceeds, the course of
litigation took two distinct paths based on the relevant jurisdiction's method of
interpreting the contracts involved. One jurisdictional approach has come to be
known as "plain terms."'" Courts in these jurisdictions attempt to give effect to the
plain language of the lease unless those terms are ambiguous. The second
jurisdictional apprcach requires analysis beyond the language of the lease to deter-
mine the intent of the parties. These jurisdictions have come to be known as
"cooperative venture" jurisdictions.
1. Plain Terms Reasoning
Two primary reasons are commonly given to justify denial of royalty under the
plain terms approazh: (1) a legal definition of "production" which requires actual
physical severance of minerals from the ground, and (2) a four corners approach to
contract interpretation. When the legal definition of production requires physical
extraction of minerals from the ground, a royalty clause premised on "production"
cannot be triggered by take-or-pay proceeds because such payments are made in lieu
of production. Reading the royalty clause to require actual physical extraction,
therefore, is consistent with a four corners interpretation.
These two reasons were used to deny lessors a claim to take-or-pay proceeds in
Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hode 9 This early take-or-pay decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dramatically impacted the
course of take-or-pay litigation. Diamond Shamrock set the stage for royalty owner
and producer arguments regarding royalty payments on take-or-pay proceeds."
In Diamond Shamrock, the lessor (the United States Government) claimed a share
of the take-or-pay payments made to its lessees." The lease in Diamond Shamrock
was a standard "production" lease which required royalties on "production saved,
removed or sold from the leased area."'
The controversy in Diamond Shamrock turned on the contract definition of "produ-
ction."' The court determined that absent ambiguity, the plain meaning of the
contract provisions must control.' The court found the meaning of "production" in
several federal statutes.' Interpreting the statutory language, the Fifth Circuit found
18. "Cooperative venture" is the term used by Professor Harrell to describe the relationship between
lessee and lessor. See Harrell, supra note 6, at 334.
19. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
20. Diamond Sham-ock addressed the issue of take-or-pay payments, while Roye and Watts address
take-or-pay settlement proceeds. The distinction is not insignificant, but it was the reasoning of the
Diamond Shamrock court that profoundly impacted the market. The Diamond Shamrock court reasoned
that take-or-pay payments are made in lieu of production and, therefore, do not trigger royalties on a
"production"-based lease. See id at 1165.
21. See id. at 1162.
22. I at 1161 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 1165-66.
24. See id. at 1168.
25. See id at 1161-66. The Diamond Shamrock court interpreted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
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the plain meaning of "production" to require the actual physical extraction of
minerals from the ground.' Because the royalty clause was premised on "produ-
ction," no royalty would be triggered unless and until the gas was actually extracted
from the ground.' Take-or-pay payments, the court reasoned, are payments made
in lieu of production, while royalties are payable only on actual production.' The
court further stated that take-or-pay proceeds were not part of the price paid for gas,
but compensation to the producer for the risks of development.'
Texas courts have maintained strict adherence to a four comers reading of Texas'
legal definition of production. In Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni,3° the Texas Court of
Appeals interpreted a royalty clause, similar to that in Diamond Shamrock, to require
actual severance of the minerals from the ground before royalty becomes due. The
Killam court relied upon the established definition of "production" in Texas which
requires the physical extraction of the minerals from the ground." The Killam court
reasoned that the lessor's chosen language in the lease "unambiguously limited its
right to royalty payments only from gas actually extracted from the land."32 This
holding has been reaffirmed in several Texas cases.33
Oklahoma decided its take-or-pay royalty rights precedent in 1996 with Roye and
established itself as a "plain terms" jurisdiction when the Oklahoma Supreme Court
ruled that the express terms of the lease agreement determine the outcome of disputes
over take-or-pay settlement proceeds.' In denial of Oklahioma's established
definition of "production,"3 however, the Roye court decided that take-or-pay
settlement proceeds are not for production, and therefore are not royalty bearing.
In Roye, the lessors sought royalties on the settlement proceeds from take-or-pay
litigation between their lessee and purchaser. That settlement resulted in a
renegotiated contract between the producer and pipeline company. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court denied the lessors an opportunity to seek such royalties, overruling
Act (OCSLA), ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994)),
and the Mineral Lands Leasing Act (MLLA), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (1920) (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994)).
26. See Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1168.
27. See id. at 1165.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1167-68.
30. 806 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1991, writ denied).
31. See id. at 267.
32. Id. at 268.
33. In Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Refining Co., 822 S.W.2d 153, 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1991, writ
denied), the court reaffirmed the holding in Killam in light of a lease provision which allowed the lessor
to claim royalties in kind and gave him the right to approve all proposed sales contracts. Also, in Hurd
Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 105-06 (Tex. Civ. App. 1992, writ denied), the court
reaffirmed the Killam decision in light of the decision in Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 943 F.2d 578
(5th Cir. 1991).
34. See Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 949 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Okla. 1996).
35. Oklahoma's legal definition of production is firmly established to require merely the capability
of production, not actual physical extraction of the minerals from the ground. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Comm'r of Land Office v. Amoco Prod. Co., 645 P.2d 468, 470 (Okla. 1982); McEvoy v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 624 P.2d 559 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980); Guard v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1978).
1999]
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the appellate court and affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the lessees. The .Roye court held that lessors are not entitled to a share of take-or-
pay settlement proceeds unless "clear language" in the lease provides for such an
arrangement.' The Roye court reasoned that because the royalty clause limited
royalty payments to substances "produced," and because take-or-pay settlement
proceeds were not for actual production, the plain terms of the contract precluded
royalties on such proceeds.37
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
lessors' rights to take-or-pay settlement proceeds in Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell?
The lease in Yates was similar to that in Diamond Shamrock." The Yates court
found the plain meaning of "production," as established in New Mexico statutes, to
require actual physical extraction of the minerals from the ground. The Yates
court, however, decided that a material issue of fact must be answered: whether the
settlement proceeds at issue are attributable, in any part, to a price adjustment for the
actual production of gas.41 This price adjustment issue was not addressed by the
Roye court, but plays a central role in Watts.
Recently, the Urited States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the
take-or-pay issue in In re Century Offshore Management Corp,42 a case that is
factually similar to Diamond Shamrock. At issue were the United States
Government's rights, as lessor, to proceeds from the settlement of a take-or-pay
contract. The relevant lease was the standard "production"-type, and "production'
was defined by federal statute 3
The Century Ofishore court clarified the holding in Diamond Shamrock, finding
that royalties must be paid on settlement proceeds when they are significantly related
to production." The Sixth Circuit stated that courts must determine whether a
sufficient "nexus" exists between production and payment to trigger the royalty clause
of the lease.45 The Century Offshore court found the settlement payments at issue
akin to "advanced payments" for gas, and thus tied such payments to future actual
extraction. Royalties on such payments are only due when the specific gas which
repays the advanced payment actually is produced" This opinion comes closer to
36. See Roye, 949 P.2d at 1212.
37. See id. The Roye court cited Walden v. Potts, 152 P.2d 923 (Okla. 1944), as authority for its
chosen definition without making any reference to the cases since Walden which make it clear that
Oklahoma "production" is merely the discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities. For a critical
discussion on the Roye court's use of authority, see Muenker, supra note 3, at 763.
38. 98 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996).
39. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
40. See id. at 123).
41. See id. at 1235.
42. 111 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
43. See supra not- 32 and accompanying text.
44. See Century Offshore, 11l F.3d at 449.
45. See id. at 450.
46. See id.
47. See id
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allowing lessors an opportunity to claim their share of royalties, but does not come
as close as the "cooperative venture" approach."
2. Cooperative Venture Reasoning
The second jurisdictional path follows the cooperative venture concept established
by Professor Thomas Harrell.49 Professor Harrell's view considers the language of
the royalty clause to express the general expectations of the parties involved ° The
terms of oil and gas leases are not designed with the intent or capability of expressly
accommodating every possible scenario which may arise between the parties. Some
interpretation and ascertainment of the parties' objectives based upon surrounding
circumstances is necessary to determine the proper intent.
Under the cooperative venture theory, lessors and lessees form a partnership to
accomplish that which neither is able to do alone - exploit the natural resources of
various reserves. The lessor owns the mineral rights, but lacks the ability to
capitalize thereon. The lessee has the expertise and money to extract the minerals,
but lacks access to the land. The two must form an association in which they are
able to share proportionately in both the risks and benefits of the venture.
In Frey v. Amoco Production Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the
Harrell view and found royalties to be owed on take-or-pay payments. Under
Louisiana law,' the lessor has a proportional interest in all of the economic benefits
derived from the minerals extracted pursuant to the lease unless such benefits were
expressly negated in the language of the lease.' The Frey court stated that:
[A]ny determination of the market value of the gas which... permits
either the lessor or the lessee to receive a part of the gross revenues from
the property greater than the fractional division contemplated by the
lease, should be considered inherently contrary to the basic nature of the
lease and be sustained only in the clearest of cases.
This formula for determining the interests of the parties can be easily applied to any
incoming revenues. The complex determination of whether revenues relate to
production or what portion of the revenues so relate need not be made. All revenues
48. It should be noted that there can be no "nexus" between production and payment unless the
producer renegotiates a new sales contract with the same purchaser. The producer, therefore, can
eliminate all obligation by settling the claim with its purchaser and then re-selling to a new purchaser.
49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
51. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992).
52. The Frey court answered a question certified by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Whether under Louisiana law and the facts concerning the Lease executed by Amoco
and Frey, the Lease's clause that provides Frey a "royalty on gas sold by the Lessee of
one-fifth (1/5) of the amount realized at the well from such sales" requires Amoco to pay
Frey a royalty share of the take-or-pay payments that Amoco earns as a result of having
executed the Lease and under the terms of a gas sales contract with a pipeline-purchaser.
Id at 170.
53. See id at 178.
54. l at 173-74.
1999]
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derived from the lease are divided between the partners according to the agreed
proportion in the royalty clause. This simplicity and flexibility should serve to relieve
both the parties and the courts of the burden of future litigation while honoring the
reasonable expectatrons of lessors and lessees.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed the cooperative
venture reasoning in Klein v. Jones."5 Royalty owners in Klein sought a share of
take-or-pay proceeds based on an unjust enrichment theory. The Klein court agreed
that equity mandated intervention. Applying Harrell's cooperative venture theory,
the Eighth Circuit allowed royalty owners to claim their share of the settlement
proceeds The comparative venture/plain terms dichotomy was reexamined outside
the context of take-or-pay settlement proceeds by the Tenth Circuit in 1997.
I7. Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Company'
A. Case History
Several lessors of oil and gas leases brought a diversity action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma against their lessee, Atlantic
Richfield Company (ARCO). The dispute arose from lease agreements for mineral
interests in the Wilburton Field in Latimer County, Oklahoma. 9 The suit followed
the settlement of a dispute between ARCO and the purchaser with whom ARCO had
a long term gas purchase agreement, the Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company
(Arkla).? Arkla breached its long term purchase agreement with ARCO, claiming
that the gas produced by ARCO was of lesser quality than that bargained for in the
contract.0 ' Arkla settled that dispute paying ARCO valuable consideration in the
form of both cash and non-cash items.'
Some of the cash proceeds received by ARCO in the settlement of the AR-
CO/Arkla dispute constituted payment for gas which was subsequently taken by
Arkla (i.e., recouped takes). Royalties were paid on this gas.' The lessors argued
that the recouped gats, all gas taken by Arkla in the past, and all future takes may
have been sold or will be sold to Arkla at a "bought-down" price.' The lessors
sought royalty payments on the settlement revenues based on breach of the
contractual duty to pay royalties.? The lessors claimed that the settlement proceeds
55. 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992).
56. See id. at 526-31.
57. See id! at 528-3 1.
58. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
59. See id at 788.
60. See id
61. See id
62. See id at 789.
63. See id. at 792.
64. See id
65. Lessors sought recovery of royalties based on six theories: (I) breach of contractual duty to pay
royalties, (2) breach of the implied covenant to market, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) constructive
fraud, (5) breach of the (futy of good faith, and (6) civil conspiracy. See id. at 789. The breach of the
contractual duty to pay royalties was the focus of the Watts court's analysis.
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constituted consideration for compromises in both price and take quantities. ARCO
refused to tender royalties to the lessors on any of the remaining proceeds, claiming
that the settlement revenues were not for actual production.'
The district court granted summary judgment to ARCO based on Roye.67 The
district court analogized these settlement payments to take-or-pay settlement
proceeds, and therefore applied the same denial of rights to the lessors as the Roye
court.' Because the relevant leases did not explicitly require royalties to be paid on
settlement proceeds and because the payments were not for the actual production and
sale of gas, the lessors were not allowed to claim royalties.
B. Decision
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed summary
judgment and remanded the case for the determination of a material issue of fact:
whether the settlement consideration paid to ARCO constitutes payment, at least in
part, for gas actually produced and sold, or whether it constitutes payment for
something other than the production and sale of gas.1O The lessors argued that
settlement proceeds must be for the production of gas because: (1) the only thing that
ARCO provides to Arkla according to the relevant settlement agreement is the
production of gas; and (2) Arkla would not make a payment without getting
something in return!'
Basing their decision on Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit held that the district
court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the settlement proceeds between
ARCO and Arkla were to be treated like nonrecoupable take-or-pay payments. The
Tenth Circuit cleared the summary judgment hurdle by making a critical distinction
that the district court neglected to make. The Tenth Circuit found that the settlement
proceeds at issue in Watts were not the same as take-or-pay settlement proceeds and
should not be treated as such.n The fact that take-or-pay settlement proceeds are not
royalty bearing does not mean that all proceeds arising from the settlement and
66. See iL ARCO and Arkla had been involved in other litigation pertaining to a Louisiana lease
and settled both litigation together. See id. The settlement agreement was somewhat complicated with
some of the exchanges in the form of non-cash consideration. See id. at 789.
67. See it at 790.
68. Watts was decided based upon Oklahoma law.
69. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 790-91.
70. See id. at 794.
71. See id. at 790.
72. See id. at 791.
73. See id. The Watts court stated: "[We hold that the district court erred in concluding that the
proceeds in this case should be treated like non-recoupable take-or-pay settlements." ItL While take-or-
pay settlement proceeds are specifically for nonproduction, see Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v.
Watson, 949 P.2d 1208, 1216 (Okla. 1996); Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10th
Cir. 1996) (rehg denied Nov. 13, 1996); Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159,
1167-68 (5th Cir. 1988), and are not subject to royalties, as the result of the Roye decision, where
royalties are contractually premised on "production," other settlement proceeds may in fact constitute
consideration for production and may therefore be royalty-bearing. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 792.
1999]
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negotiation of a gas contract are non-royalty bearing.74 In the case of settlement
proceeds other than those resulting from take-or-pay litigation, the nature of the
consideration must be determined."5
With this determination, the Watts court noted that an actual or patent price
reduction is not the triggering mechanism which indicates the duty to pay royalties
or the measurement for such royalties.76 Instead, any agreement made by the lessee
which compromises its rights to pursue a higher price for the gas in exchange for a
lump sum payment implicates the duty to pay royalties even if the price prior to
settlement and the price after settlement are the same.'
IV. Analysis
A. The Distinction Between Roye and Watts
Roye was a critical decision in Oklahoma oil and gas law on a burgeoning issue
which previously had not been addressed in that jurisdiction. For reasons not
specified in the decision itself, the settlement between the pipeline and producer in
Roye was kept "confidential." The royalty owners were not allowed to discover the
terms of that agreement during suit against their lessee.? This secrecy highlights the
producers' ability to disguise proceeds which in fact constitute a buy-down on the
renegotiated gas sales contract between the producer and pipeline, preventing the
lessor from discovering the foul. 9 With the settlement negotiations kept secret,
lessors are denied azcess to the evidence of the buy-down.
The Roye decision was not in accordance with Oklahoma precedent' and
threatened to deprive Oklahoma land owners of their present and future interests in
oil and gas leases. This decision is difficult to reconcile with prior case law.
Oklahoma precedent indicates a method of interpreting oil and gas leases much like
that of Louisiana and Arkansas, both of which have explicitly adopted the
cooperative venture line of reasoning. This method is manifested in Tara Petroleum
Corp. v. Hughey."' Ih Tara, the Oklahoma Supreme Court looked beyond the plain
meaning of the words "market price" in a gas lease.' The Tara court determined
that "necessity of the market" mandated an alternate interpretation of "market price"
contrary to its plain meaning.' The Tara court made this finding based on fairness
74. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 791.
75. See id. at 794.
76. See id. at 793.
77. See idt
78. See Roye, 949 P.2d at 1211.
79. Amicus curiae for the lessors in Roye argued that the settlement proceeds are royalty bearing
because they are a "marleting substitute," and, therefore, constitute monies paid for the gas.
80. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
81. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
82. See id. at 1273.
83. See id.
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to the producer.' The Roye court, oddly, made no mention of this case, and
dismissed the Tara approach in favor of a plain terms approach.'
Even assuming the legitimacy of Oklahoma's adoption of a plain terms approach,
one would expect Oklahoma courts to find the plain meaning of "production" to be
in accordance with Oklahoma precedent. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has defined
"production" as merely the capability of producing minerals in paying quantities, not
actual extraction of the minerals from the ground.' This view is in contradiction to
the majority view which requires actual production of the minerals. Again, the Roye
court made no mention of Oklahoma's definition in finding production to require the
actual physical extraction of the minerals from the ground.
The Roye holding was not explained well by the court and the decision remains
unexplainable. The Roye court's errors worked an injustice upon Oklahoma gas
lessors and cost them hundreds of millions of dollars, collectively, in lost royalty.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took a step toward correcting Oklahoma
precedent in Watts. In Watts, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Oklahoma law as it would
apply to oil and gas lease matters that were related to take-or-pay proceeds or
settlements rather than the take-or-pay settlement proceeds themselvesY
The only significant difference between the facts of Roye and Watts is the nature
of the proceeds at issue. In Roye, the court addressed take-or-pay settlement
proceeds. In Watts, the Tenth Circuit dealt with the lessors' right to share in the
settlement proceeds of a long-term take contract disputed on grounds other than the
take-or-pay nature - the difference being the nature of the claim between the
producer and pipeline company. While the distinction is subtle, the implication of the
Watts holding is that Roye is limited to take-or-pay settlement cases and that there
still exists hope for the lessors in Oklahoma to assert their rights to the future
economic benefits of the lease.' The blow to lessors' royalty rights dealt by the
Roye court, therefore, may have been remedied by the distinction made by the Tenth
Circuit in Watts.
B. Limitations of the Watts Court
The Watts court applied the three guiding principles established in Harvey E. Yates
v. Powell' to determine whether royalties were due on the settlement proceeds at
84. See id.
85. Prior to Roye, several commentators predicted that Oklahoma would adopt the cooperative
venture approach. See Randy King, Royalty Owner Claims to Take-or-Pay Payments Under the Implied
Covenant to Market and the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 33 S. TEX. L.J. 801 (1992); see also,
Lowe, supra note 1.
86. See supra note 35.
87. The issue of take-or-pay settlement proceeds had already been settled in Oklahoma by the Roye
decision.
88. In fact, the Roye court explicitly noted that it was limited in its decision to the facts before it.
See Roye, 949 P.2d at 1216.
89. 98 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996). Yates was a Tenth Circuit case based on New Mexico law which
dealt with a similar issue as that in Watts. Specifically, the relevant issue was whether lessors are entitled
to royalties on cash payments from gas purchasers to lessees in settlement of take-or-pay disputes. See
id. at 1226.
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issue. According to the first principle, no royalties are due on the relevant leases
unless and until gas is actually physically extracted from the ground.' This principle
is the product of those jurisdictions which legally define "production" to require
actual physical extraction of minerals from the ground. Where the legal definition of
"production" is such, requiring extraction of the minerals can be justified. Such a
reading is in accordance with a four comers approach to contract interpretation.
The Roye court defined "production" to require actual physical extraction of the
minerals from the ground." Oklahoma, though, has no such legal definition of
production.' By fashioning this unprecedented definition, the Roye court crippled
Oklahoma lessors in their ability to claim due royalties by depriving them of the
benefit of the true plain meaning of "production." Because Watts was decided based
on Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit was bound by this principle as the result of
Roye.
Although Watts ultimately allowed the lessors an opportunity to make a claim, the
Watts holding is, nevertheless, limited by this production principle. There must be
a subsequent extraction of gas from the ground and a sale of that gas to the purchaser
from whom the settlement or other proceeds are received to require royalties. If a
producer settles a dispute with one purchaser and then negotiates a new sales contract
with a different pipeline company, then the lessor has no claim to royalty because no
"nexus" will exist between the production and sale to trigger the debt." Only when
the producer continues to sell gas to the same purchaser can a connection be found
between revenues and actual production. Thus to some extent, the production
principle restricts Oklahoma lessors' rights to those situations in which producers and
pipeline companies maintain an ongoing relationship.
The second Yates principle holds that nonrecoupable proceeds received by the
producer as settlement of a breach of the take-or-pay provision of the supply contract
are not royalty bearirg." Such proceeds are specifically for nonproduction, and are
therefore contrary to a royalty clause which requires actual production.95 The
implicit nonproductio n quality of such payments breaks the nexus between production
and payment. The Roye holding is also premised on this principle. The inherent
nonproduction quality of the nonrecoupable payments is the reason that the Roye
court granted summary judgment to the lessee.
In Century Offshore, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals limited this
principle to payments in settlement of debt which accrued under a take-or-pay
contract as the result of the purchaser's failure to take. Though basing its decision on
Diamond Shamrock, the Century Offshore court came to a conclusion opposite of that
90. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 792. The relevant lease was a standard "production"-type lease like that
in Roye.
91. See Roye, 949 P.' d at 1216.
92. See supra note 35.
93. The "nexus" requirement was articulated in In re Century Offshore Management Corp., 111 F.3d
443 (6th Cir. 1997), but the concept is implicit in the production principle of Yates. Without a
connection to actual production, no royalty is due.
94. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 792.
95. See id
[Vol. 52:145
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss1/7
NOTES
made in Diamond Shamrock. The Century Offshore court found a link between the
proceeds of the settlement and the sale of gas. This link triggered royalties.' The
Sixth Circuit found that there was no inherent nonproduction quality to the proceeds
at issue in Century Offshore.
The difference between the cases is the nature of the settlement proceeds at issue.
In Diamond Shamrock, the producer settled with the pipeline company on debt
accrued due to a failure to take the minimum quantity of gas required by the contract.
In Century Offshore, the pipeline did not have accrued debt to the producer9
Instead, the pipeline paid the producer $12,250,000 to buy out the existing sales
contract and negotiate a new agreement."
The Century Offshore decision, therefore, would limit the second Yates principle
to debt accrued from the failure to take on a take-or-pay contract. Only such accrued
debt has the implicit nonproduction quality which breaks the nexus between
production and payment. In Century Offshore, the Sixth Circuit found a nexus to
exist when the pipeline paid the lump sum payment simply in order to renegotiate its
take-or-pay agreement."°  This restriction is important to lessors because it
minimizes the instances in which they will be denied their royalty share of the
proceeds derived from their leases.
The third Yates principle provides that any portion of the settlement proceeds
which constitute a "buy-down" of the contractually owed price of gas is royalty
bearing when such gas is actually produced and taken at the bought-down price.1 '
Only the amount of such proceeds that reflects a fair apportionment of the price
adjustment payment over the purchases affected by that price adjustment is royalty
bearing."~ This "buy-down" theory was precisely the argument of the lessors in
Roye, which the court found inapplicable to take-or-pay settlement proceeds. 3 This
principle leads to the necessary inquiry into the nature of non-take-or-pay settlement
proceeds. This inquiry takes the case beyond summary judgment. When a producer
trades valuable consideration for a reduced price on the gas actually produced, then
royalties are not only owed on the sale of gas at the bought-down rate, but also on
a commensurate portion of the consideration which gave effect to that lower
price."° Such proceeds are not payments for nonproduction; rather, they are for
actual production."
96. See Century Offshore, 111 F.3d at 449.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 447.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 448.
101. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 792.
102. See hiL
103. See Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 949 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Okla. 1996).
104. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 792.
105. This relationship between the settlement proceeds and the renegotiated price is the "nexus"
described by the Century Offshore court. See Century Offshore, 111 F.3d at 448-49.
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Applying the three guiding principles of Yates, the Watts court found that gas had
actually been extracted from the ground."° In this regard, the Watts court referred
to the gas taken by Arkla since the settlement of the ARCO/Arkla dispute."t0 This
subsequent taking is the gas at the heart of the issue and the taking of which clears
the Watts lessors of summary judgment under the first of the Yates principles."'
Because there was a continuing sales relationship after the settlement between the
producer and pipeline, and because no facts before the court indicated the proceeds
to be limited to accrued failure to take debt, summary judgment was inappropriate
in Watts.
The Yates principles, as applied in the Watts decision, offer Oklahoma lessors hope
of a legitimate claim to the proceeds of their leases in the future. Denied this hope
are take-or-pay proceeds, which have been precluded by Roye. In all other cases, an
inquiry must be mad. whether the settlement proceeds constitute consideration for
gas purchased at a bought-down price or whether the proceeds account for price
reductions attributable to future production under the renegotiated contract1c9
Applying Watts, if any agreement by a producer compromises its right to pursue a
higher price for the gas in exchange for valuable consideration, then that compromise
triggers a duty to pay royalties." Whatever settlement consideration the lessee
receives in that compromise is a component of the true price paid for the gas, and
is therefore royalty bearing."' A refusal on the part of the lessee to pay such
royalties would result in a windfall for the lessee."' The nature of the settlement
proceeds, therefore, created an issue of material fact that precluded summary
judgment and offered lessors their deserved day in court.
106. Watts, 115 F.3d at 791.
107. See id, at 792.
108. According to Yates, without actual production, summary judgment for the lessee would have
been appropriate. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 793.
111. See id.
112. See id. The Watts court illustrated this windfall by the following hypothetical:
Suppose that a purchaser is obligated to take 1,000,000 units of gas at $4.00 per unit
payable in two equal installments of $2 million. Upon receiving the first 500,000 units,
the purchaser unilaterally reduces the price to $3.00 per unit (claiming that the gas is of
substandard quality) and remits payment of only $1.5 million. In response, the producer
files a lawsuit for $1 million, the amount due on the past price deficiency and the
anticipated future slortfall. Instead of litigating the gas quality issue, the parties agree to
settle their dispute. In exchange for a one-time lump sum payment of $500,000, the
producer agrees to forgive the past price deficiency and to accept the lower price of only
$3.00 per unit for future production. In this situation, there has been no "buy down" (i.e.,
actual price reduction). The pre-settlement price and the post-settlement price are both
$3.00 per unit. Despite the absence of a price reduction, however, the lump sum payment
still constitutes proceeds from the sale of gas because it represents a component of the
true price paid for both past and future production under the supply contract. No one
would dispute, therefore, that the royalty owners are entitled to their royalty share of the
lump sum payment.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
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C. Implications of the Distinction
The Watts decision may suffer great difficulty in its application, despite being
more legally sound than the holding in Roye. Rather than finding as a matter of law
that the settlement proceeds were not bargained for in the royalty clause of the lease
simply because such explicit language was absent, the Watts court recognized the
danger of such a hasty conclusion"' and found that a material issue of fact existed
in the determination of the nature of the proceeds."4 The Watts court noted that
producers cannot escape their duty to pay royalties to lessors by "disguising"
revenues as consideration for something other than the sale of gas."5
Watts recognized that lessees have the ability to structure proceeds of settlements
in ways that effectively deny the lessors their due royalty."6 The Roye court failed
to make this observation with regard to take-or-pay settlements. The distinction the
Tenth Circuit made in Watts regarding the nature of the settlement proceeds at issue
is critical to the determination of lessors' rights in future related litigation.
It is important to address this issue because several other economic benefits
derived from the lease are either currently at issue or will be in the near future. For
example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorizes interstate
pipelines to charge their customers certain demand charges"7 and other marketing
fees that may eventually be passed onto producers in one form or another. Gas
inventory charges are one such demand charge to gas customers made by the pipeline
to the producer for standing ready to supply gas to their customers."' Reservation
fees are also charged to gas customers to guarantee service."' It seems more than
likely that royalty owners will look for a share of these proceeds as they are passed
along to their partners.
Absent the distinction made by the Watts court, the Roye precedent may apply to
all settlement proceeds and to a variety of other price-disguising payments for both
oil and gas. Under Roye, lessees can structure settlements and other economic
benefits derived from the lease as something other than production, and can therefore
manipulate the appearance of consideration to their advantage so as to minimize
royalty obligations to their lessors.'
D. The Application of Watts
Under Watts, lessors have the opportunity to stake their claim to the various
economic benefits which arise out of the mineral leases. The Watts court noted that
the reasoning of the case is not limited to actual "buy-down" agreements, but
113. See supra note 110.
114. See Watts, 115 F.3d at 794.
115. See id
116. See id. at792.
117. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 273
(9th ed. 1994).
118. See id. at 451; see also id. at 543 (giving a definition of "inventory reserve charge').
119. See id.
120. See supra note 110.
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"extends to any settlement in which a producer receives consideration for
compromising its pricing claim ... ,,"2 It would seem that demand charges and
any other marketing fees passed along to producers will play some role in the pricing
of gas. It is unlikely that pipeline companies will be willing to pass along any
economic benefits to lessees without receiving something in return. That something
must be the gas produced.
This method of determining the proper apportionment of the revenues derived from
the lease is not as simple as the cooperative venture method, but it is significantly
better for lessors than holding that the absence of specific language in the lease leads
to an absence of rights regarding the object of such language. The cooperative
venture theory applies uniformly to all economic benefits derived from the lease,
regardless of how such proceeds are labeled. Each partner takes his portion of all
proceeds in accordance with the lease agreement. The Watts reasoning applies to
future issues in a more complicated manner. Applying the Watts reasoning will likely
result in even more litigation over issues such as what constitutes consideration for
pricing compromises and the identification of the portion of the revenues that actually
account for such a compromise. Regardless of the complexity, lessors now have an
opportunity to address those issues which they did not, or could not, have incor-
porated in the lease.
Computing damages through the inquiry mandated by Watts will necessarily entail
a great deal of litigation and difficulty. Such difficulty was encountered by the lessor
in Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co." In Piney Woods, a
Mississippi district court had to make a determination of the meaning of "market
value" of gas. Upon finally concluding that "market value" referred to the spot-
market value, the Piney Woods court attempted to measure the damages." This
measurement was very complex, as it required the determination of the spot-market
price of gas of similar quality and sold in similar quantities at the time each sale of
gas was made. In the end, the Piney Woods court found many of the lessor's
measures of those factors to be "speculative at best.""z The lessors were allowed
partial recovery after more than twenty years of litigation.
A determination cf the issue identified by Watts will be similarly complex and
speculative. Any time that economic benefits flow to the lessee, as in the case of
settlement proceeds, a determination will have to be made as to what portion of those
proceeds accounts for a price compromise and what portion accounts for other
economic factors. Alternatively, a determination of how much actual "buy-down"
occurred may be established by comparing the price paid for gas and the price that
would have been received absent the disputed proceeds." s Either way, significant
difficulties are encountered that make the process costly and imprecise.
121. Watts, 115 F.3d at 793.
122. No. CIV.A.3:74-CV-307WS, 1995 WL 917482 (S.D. Miss. June 6, 1995).
123. See Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 905 F.2d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (Piney
Woods MV).
124. Piney Woods, No. CIV.A.3:74-CV-307WS, 1995 WL 917482, at *12.
125. This is similar to the Piney Woods evaluation. The lessor would essentially have to establish
the market value of the gis by demonstrating similar sales of like quality gas in similar quantities.
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V. Conclusion
From the lessors' perspective, Oklahoma oil and gas law is grim. The Roye
decision has rendered lessors helpless in their attempt to claim their full share of the
economic benefits of their leases. Roye, and its abomination of Oklahoma law,
eliminated any possible claim by lessors to the billions of dollars worth of take-or-
pay settlement proceeds recovered by prodiicers since the 1980s.
The future of Oklahoma oil and gas law is, as yet, uncertain. The best solution to
the Roye dilemma would be to overrule the case altogether and to adopt a new line
of reasoning which is based on Oklahoma "production" and Oklahoma contract
interpretation. The Frey reasoning would be ideal. This cooperative venture theory
would allow the intent of the parties to guide the outcome of the decisions, while still
allowing for the application of Oklahoma "production" in the interpretation of the
royalty clause.
Watts offers promise to lessors that their rights to future economic benefits of their
leases will be supported by the courts. The Tenth Circuit attempted to interpret
Oklahoma state law in Watts as it would apply to settlement proceeds of a non-take-
or-pay nature. This distinction is crucial to the future rights of Oklahoma lessors, but
it remains to be seen whether Oklahoma will adopt this new line of reasoning.
Stephen Joseph Capron
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